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LABOR LAW-POST-EXPIRATION ARBITRABILITY UNDER COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Luden's Inc. v. Local Union No. 6

I.

INTRODU( TION

The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) represents the ultimate
compromise effected between a union and management.' It contractually
defines each party's rights and obligations and, in the event they disagree,
substitutes neutral arbitration in place of disruptive labor practices such as
strikes and lockouts. 2 Whether such an arbitration clause survives the expiration of a CBA is of critical importance to both employer and em1. See Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960). In Warrior
& Gulf the United States Supreme Court defined a collective bargaining agreement as:
an effort to erect a system of industrial self-government. When most parties enter into contractual relationship they do so voluntarily, in the sense
that there is no real compulsion to deal with one another, as opposed to
dealing with other parties. This is not true of the labor agreement. The
choice is generally not between entering or refusing to enter into a relationship, for that in all probability pre-exists the negotiations. Rather it is
between having that relationship governed by an agreed-upon rule of law
or leaving each and every matter subject to a temporary resolution dependent solely upon the relative strength, at any given moment, of the contending forces. The mature labor agreement may attempt to regulate all
aspects of the complicated relationship, from the most crucial to the most
minute over an extended period of time.
Id.; see also Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon LaborArbitration, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1482,
1498-99 (1959) (commenting that collective bargaining agreement is document
that union and employees use to impose limits and express restrictions upon
management).
2. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In Lincoln Mills,
the Court found that the congressional intent was to promote the collective bargaining process in an attempt to avoid the more radical remedy of strikes. Id. at
453. Further, the Court held that the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is
the quid pro quo for a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at
455. Thus, the Court found that federal policy favors arbitration as a method of
preserving industrial peace. Id.; see also Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union,
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). In Boys Markets, the Court considered the appropriateness of injunctive relief under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947. Id. at 237-38. As a practical matter, the Court found that any incentive for employers to enter into CBAs is dissipated if the no-strike clause cannot be
enforced. Id. at 248. In fact, the Court believed that the purpose of arbitration
procedures is to replace traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution such as
strikes, lockouts or other self-help measures. Id. at 249. Finally, finding that Congress attached great importance to voluntary settlement of labor disputes without
resort to self-help, the Court concluded that injunctive relief was an appropriate
measure when a union strikes in violation of the no-strike provision contained in
the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 252-53.

(957)
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ployee.5 If, for instance, the clause does not survive and no duty to
arbitrate exists, then employees' remedies are severely curtailed. 4 Nevertheless, employers reasonably object to being held liable to arbitration
under the terms of an expired agreement. 5 In Litton FinancialPrinting
Division v. NLRB, 6 the United States Supreme Court reversed settled principles of dispute resolution by suggesting that the courts look to the merits
of claims arising under expired CBAs to determine their arbitrability. 7 By
utilizing this new approach the Court resolved the underlying claim

3. SeeJohn F. Corcoran, The Arbitrability of Labor Grievances that Arise After Expiration of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1073 (1993). After

first noting that the goal of reducing industrial strife has led to the federal policy
favoring arbitration, Corcoran urges Congress to enact legislation extending the
duty to arbitrate in the post-expiration period. Id. at 1091. He argues for this

result because arbitrators are presumed to have greater competence in interpreting collective bargaining agreements than the courts, and arbitration furthers the
parties' presumed objectives in creating the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
4. See Corcoran, supra note 3, at 1077 (noting that arbitration is relied upon
in lieu of resort to "ultimate economic weapon," the strike). Once the arbitral
stage is removed from the grievance procedure, the dispute is actually less likely to
be mutually or impartially resolved. Id. at 1079. Corcoran finds arbitration analogous to the heart of a living organism. Id. Once the heart is removed, the remainder of the body cannot function. Id. Arbitration agreements are intended to lead
to joint resolution of disputes between labor and management by "an impartial
third-party - the arbitrator." Id. Thus, Corcoran finds that removing arbitration
from the process reduces the likelihood that impartial settlements can be reached.
Id. The effect on employees is to reduce peaceful means of resolving labor disputes. Id.
5. See Nolde Bros. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers Union,
430 U.S. 243, 250 (1977). In Nolde, the employer argued that because the duty to
arbitrate was strictly a creature of the contract, it necessarily expired with the collective bargaining contract. Id. The employer stressed that numerous prior decisions of the Supreme Court established the proposition that " 'arbitration is a
matter of contract and [that] a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration
any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.' " Id. (quoting Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)); see Gateway Coal Co. v.
Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974) (holding that party cannot be compelled
to submit grievance to arbitration without contracting to do so); John Wiley &
Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964) (same); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining
Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962) (same). Hence, Nolde argued that forcing the employer to arbitration would run contrary to federal labor policy of prohibiting compulsory arbitration unless the parties are bound by an arbitration agreement. Id.
While the Nolde Court did not disagree with the employers' contention, it found it
inapplicable in this instance because the dispute in question arose under the contract's terms and thus was one the parties had agreed to arbitrate. Id. at 252.
6. 501 U.S. 190 (1991).
7. Id. The decision in Litton purported merely to interpret the Court's previous decision in Nolde. Id. at 193. However, the Court's holding concerning the

need to review the merits of the underlying dispute far exceeded the scope of the
original Nolde decision. See id. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that Court
erred in reaching merits of issue rather than submitting them to arbitrator).
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presented in'Litton.8 Consequently, the Court usurped the ultimate func9
tion of the arbitrator.
Recently the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Luden's Inc. v. Local Union No. 6,10 provided a novel ruling on this issue.

The Third Circuit avoided a Litton review on the merits of the underlying
claim and instead applied contract theory to find that an implied-in-fact
contract survived the expiration of the CBA." Because the Luden's court
found the arbitration clause in effect under the surviving implied-in-fact
contract, the arbitrator was ultimately free to rule on the merits of the
2
underlying claim.'
8. See id. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding majority decision contrary
to prior decision announced in Nolde and to labor law policy of leaving determination on underlying merits of claim to arbitrator). For a discussion of the facts and
circumstances resulting in litigation in Litton, see infra note 63.
9. Id. at 213 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for fearing that ar-

bitrators cannot decide issue correctly).
Commentators have severely criticized the majority's decision. See Corcoran,
supra note 3, at 1085-86 (arguing that Litton Court misinterpreted previous Nolde
decision, narrowed applicable standard concerning when arbitrable grievances survive expiration of CBA, and immediately misapplied its own new test); see also
Clyde W. Summers, The Trilogy and its Offspring Revisited: It's a Contract, Stupid, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. i021, 1031-32 (1993) (commenting that Litton was inconsistent with
contract analysis and previous policies established by Court); Michael J. Hartley,
Survey, A More Rigorous Standardfor Post-ExpirationEnforcement of Arbitration Clauses:
Litton Financial Printing v. NLRB, 33 B.C. L. REv. 351, 357-58 (1992) (arguing that
because no clear standard emerges from Litton, each situation will have to be de-

cided on case-by-case basis). Hartley further contends that the Litton decision may
actually spawn new litigation because the Court determined the bases under which
arbitration could survive in very general terms, leaving parties plenty of room for
future argument. Id.
For a more favorable analysis of the Litton decision, see Diane Fox, Litton v.
NLRB: Evolution of the Post-ExpirationDuty to Arbitrate Grievances, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 161 (1993). Fox contends that Litton provided much needed clarification for lower courts concerning the arbitrability of disputes under expired CBAs.
Id. at 161.
10. 28 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. 1994).
11. Id. at 354. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's application of contract
law to the expired CBA, see infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
12. Id. at 354 (applying implied-in-fact contract theory to avoid looking at
merits of underlying claim). The application of contract theory to resolve questions arising under CBAs is not unique to Luden'sr however, it is not an approach
wholly endorsed by the Supreme Court. Compare Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962) (holding that strike to settle dispute when CBA instead mandates arbitration violates accepted principles of traditional contract law)
with Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960) (criticizing decisions of lower courts for being overly preoccupied with contract law when reviewing arbitrability under CBAs).
Commentators contend that the Supreme Court's earlier decisions, for historical reasons, tend to obscure the underlying contract principles that may actually
provide a helpful framework for understanding those decisions. See Summers,
supra note 9, at 1027. For example, Summers argues that the language the Court
used in many decisions extolling arbitration and arbitrators was unnecessary. Id. at
1029. Under the contractual framework, the only question is what forum the par-
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This Casebrief considers the Third Circuit's unique theory and approach as contrasted with other circuits' interpretations of the applicable
Supreme Court precedent. The next section summarizes the basic case
law concerning whether and when a duty to arbitrate survives an expired
CBA. i s Section III discusses the Third Circuit's approach in Luden's in
light of Supreme Court precedent and the express policies driving the
development of federal labor law. 14 Additionally, the third section considers potential problems in the application of the Third Circuit's implied-infact contract theory. 15 Finally, Section IV summarizes how an implied-infact contract is established after the expiration of a collective bargaining
16
agreement.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Policies Driving Promulgation of the National Labor Relations Act

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted in 1935 with
the express intention of promoting industrial peace. 17 The Supreme
Court found this goal to be the defining policy behind the NLRA and a
strong influence on the ensuing case law. i8 Because the NLRA and the
ties have agreed upon to resolve disputes. Id. Even viewed from this perspective,
Summers believes that the cases would have been decided the same way. Id.
13. For a discussion of the history of the duty to arbitrate under expired collective bargaining agreements, see infra notes 17-78 and accompanying text.
14. For a comparison of the implied-in-fact contract theory with previous decisions in the same context, see infra notes 79-109 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of potential problems in applying the implied-in-fact contract theory, see infra notes 110-27 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of what steps the Third Circuit indicated must be taken to
avoid the implied-in-fact contract, see infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
17. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)). The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) reads in pertinent part:

Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by
encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees.
49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151).
18. See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475
U.S. 643, 651 (1986) (noting longstanding federal policy to promote industrial
harmony through CBAs); Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U.S.
364, 371-372 (1984) (stating that arbitration "furthers the national labor policy of
peaceful resolution of labor disputes"); Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414
U.S. 368, 377 (1974) (noting strong federal policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes).
The NLRA was enacted based on the constitutional theory that statutory regulation was necessary to diminish industrial strife, because such strife posed a threat
to interstate commerce. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAw
28 (3d ed. 1993). Both the NLRA and the subsequently enacted Taft-Hartley
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subsequent modifications added by the Taft-Hartley Act provide only a
framework for industrial relations, rather than a precise guide, judicial decisions are of paramount importance in determining the outcome in labor
disputes.19
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,2 0 the Supreme Court con-

strued section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) as
empowering the federal courts to develop a federal common law in suits
arising under CBAs.2 1 The Lincoln Mills decision resolved previous disamendments (Taft-Hartley Act) intended to define the role of the courts and the
National Labor Relations Board in labor relations. Id. at 31. Gould notes that the
Supreme Court, in interpreting the language of the Taft-Hartley Act, has held that
Congress intended to promote the arbitration process. Id. at 141.
19. ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 87 (11th ed.
1991). The NLRA was intended to provide a framework for industrial relations,

not a complete code. Id. The original sponsors dealt only with those problems
that were most urgent in 1935, leaving the gaps to be filled in either by existing
state law or in the future. Id.
As originally enacted in 1935, the NLRA, also called the Wagner Act, focused
on protecting employees' and unions' right to organize in the face of tyrannical

and often violent repercussions from employers. See § 7, 49 Stat. at 452 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157). Section 7 of the Wagner Act provides that
"[e] mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... Id.
The Taft-Hartley Amendments, enacted in 1947, were promulgated to protect
employers and employees from overreaching unions; thus, Taft-Hartley supple-

mented the original language of the Wagner Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 157. Under the
original Wagner Act, § 7, shown above, ended with the word "protection;" the TaftHartley Amendments added language stating "and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3)." Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 140 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C.

§ 157).
In 1947, Congress also promulgated the Labor Management Relations Act

(LMRA). See 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994)).

The LMRA's stated purpose was to provide the procedural mechanisms by which

employees and employers could exercise their statutory rights under the NLRA.
See 29 U.S.C. § 141. Section 301 of the LMRA, for example, vests jurisdiction for
suits involving contract disputes in federal district courts. § 301, 61 Stat. at 156
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185).
20. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
21. Id. at 451. In Lincoln Mills, the Court held that § 301 of the LMRA autho-

rizes federal courts to fashion substantive federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Id. Reading § 301 (a) and § 301(b) together, the
Court noted that § 301(b) provided the procedural remedy, thus, § 301(a) did
something more. Id. While the Court found the legislative history behind § 301
both "cloudy and confusing," overall the Court held that it supported the inference that the Congressional intent was to authorize a federal policy of using federal courts to enforce CBAs. Id. at 452-55. Coining the now-famous phrase that
"the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes was considered as quid pro quo of a

no-strike agreement," the Court noted that the failure to arbitrate was "not a part
and parcel of the abuses against which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was aimed." Id. at
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putes over whether federal courts should apply federal or state law in deciding such suits. 22 Specifically, in Lincoln Mills, the Court held that
federal law should apply and should be fashioned from the policies of the

NLRA2S
Subsequently, in the trilogy of Steelworkers cases (Steelworkers Trilogy),
the Supreme Court identified four principles, all arising from the general
NLRA policy, to guide courts when determining whether a labor dispute is
arbitrable.24 First, the parties must have contracted to submit the griev455-58. Thus, the Court concluded thatinjunctive relief was not barred by law in
these situations. Id.
While § 301 made collective bargaining agreements enforceable in federal
courts, courts struggled with the issue of whether the arbitration clauses contained
within most collective bargaining agreements were enforceable in federal court
because the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred injunctions in labor disputes. GOULD,
supra note 18, at 140. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed several years before

the NLRA, and provides in § 1 that "[n]o court of the United States... shall have
jurisdiction to issue any... injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute, except in strict conformity with the provisions of the Act ...." NorrisLaGuardia Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1994)). Section 2 explains that the rationale behind the rule is to protect
employees right to organize freely in an effort to negotiate terms and conditions of
employment. Id. § 2 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)). The Court in Lincoln
Mills concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was inapplicable because arbitration did not involve problems arising from the abuses that prompted the passage
of the Act. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 458-59. For a thorough discussion of the
legislative history and intent behind § 301 and the subsequent case law, see 1 PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw (3d ed. 1992).
22. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 450-51. Two vieoints were advanced concerning the construction that should be given § 301(a) of the LMRA. Id. at 450.
Under one view, § 301 (a) merely confers jurisdiction to federal courts in controversies involving labor organizations and is not a source of substantive law itself,
nor does it send federal judges to state law for answers. Id. The second view espoused by the Court is that § 301(a) is more than merely jurisdictional; it authorizes the federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcing of CBAs.
Id. at 451.
Thus, Lincoln Mills can be construed as foreclosing state law claims by parties
to or individuals covered under CBAs. The topic of state preemption extends well
beyond the scope of this article; however, it is worth noting that the extent to
which § 301 preempts state law has been the subject of numerous court cases in
recent years. See Rebecca Hanner White, Section 301's Preemption of State Law Claims:
A Model for Analysis, 41 ALA. L. REV. 377 (1990). White contends that recent
Supreme Court decisions reflect a consistent approach to § 301 preemption. Id. at
379. She claims that if a CBA is in force, then any state law claim arising out of the
employee-employer relationship will be preempted. Id. In addition, state law will
be preempted where the claim arises out of interpretation of either express or
implied terms in the CBA. Id.
23. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456. While some substantive remedies are expressly furnished by the LMRA, others will lack express statutory sanction, but can
be determined by reviewing the policy behind the legislation and fashioning a
remedy in accordance with that policy. Id. at 457.
24. Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); see also Cumberland Typographical
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ance to arbitration. 25 Second, the question of whether the parties have
agreed to arbitrate is for the courts to decide.2 6 Under the third principle, the courts cannot weigh the merits of the underlying substantive
claim. 27 Thus, even when an employer argues that the claim advanced is
Union 244 v. Times & Alleganian Co., 943 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1991) (providing
good summary and example of application of four Steelworkers Trilogy principles).
In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court addressed questions left unanswered by Lincoln Mills concerning what the courts' role should be concerning
arbitration. See GOULD, supra note 18, at 141. In making that determination, the
Court looked to previous judicial decisions. Id. at 142. At that time, the leading
case was from the New York Court of Appeals, where the court, in interpreting the
CBA, decided the case on the underlying merits. Id. In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the
Supreme Court reacted out of concern that a detailed examination of the merits of
the underlying dispute would deprive the parties of their bargain that the arbitrator should have jurisdiction over such matters. Id. In an analysis of these decisions, Professor Summers identified an additional concern that once courts
meddled in the underlying merits of the disputes, they would become unduly burdened by such cases. Summers, supra note 9, at 1026.
For a discussion of the principles established in the Steelworkers Tilogy, see Cox
et al., supra note 19, at 880-82; and William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of Labor
ArbitrationAwards-Thirty Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath ofAT&T and
Misco, 64 NOTRE" DAME L. REv. 464 (1984) (providing excellent analysis of Steelworkers Trilogy and subsequent impact).
25. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582. The Court held that "[a] rbitration is a
matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." Id.; see also, Carbon Fuel Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 219 (1979) (citing Warrior & Gulffor proposition, that parties cannot be forced to arbitrate in absence of contractual agreement); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974) ("No
obligation to arbitrate a labor dispute arises solely by operation of law."); Kingsport
Publishing Corp. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 660, 661 (6th Cir. 1968) (reasoning that despite congressional policy favoring arbitration, duty rests on contractual basis);
Proctor & Gamble Indep. Union v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181, 184
(2d Cir. 1962) (finding duty to arbitrate wholly contractual and courts determine
if contract imposes that duty), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
26. Warrior& Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582. Congress assigned to the courts the responsibility of determining whether the promise to arbitrate has been breached.
Id. Arbitration is a matter of contract; thus, a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute without prior agreement. Id. But, to be consistent with Congressional policy favoring resolution of disputes through arbitration, the judicial
inquiry must be confined to the question of whether the reluctant party actually
agreed to arbitrate the grievance or to give the arbitrator power to make the
award. Id.;. see also AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am.,
475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986) (concluding that arbitrability is unquestionably issue for
judicial determination); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557-58
(1964) (concluding that issues of "substantive arbitrability" are for courts to determine and "procedural arbitrability" are for arbitrator to decide). For a more detailed discussion of Warrior & Gulf, see infra note 27.
27. Enterprise Whee4 363 U.S. at 596. The Supreme Court held that courts
should refuse to review the merits of an arbitration award under collective bargaining agreements. Id. The Court reasoned that the federal policy of settling labor
disputes by arbitration would be jeopardized if courts had the last say on the merits
of the awards. Id. Finally, the Court found that the arbitrator's award is legitimate
as long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 597.
In Enterprise Wheel, there was a collective bargaining agreement that provided
that "any differences 'as to the meaning and application' of the agreement should
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completely unmeritorious, such a decision is for the arbitrator to make,
not for the court.2 8 Finally, under the fourth principle, when doubt exists,
be submitted to arbitration and that the arbitrator's decision 'shall be final and
binding on the parties.' " Id. at 594. Further, special provisions contained in the
following passage governed the suspension and discharge of employees:
Should it be determined by the Company or by an arbitrator in accordance with the grievance procedure that the employee has been suspended unjustly or discharged in violation of the provisions of this
Agreement, the Company shall reinstate the employee and pay full compensation at the employee's regular rate of pay for the time lost.
Id. A group of employees left their jobs protesting another employee's discharge.
Id. at 595. The arbitrator found the employee's discharge unjustified. Id. As a
remedy, he awarded reinstatement with back pay, minus pay for a 10-day suspension and whatever other sums the employee earned from other employment. Id.
The employer refused to comply with the award. Id. The district court directed the employer to comply. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that the award was unenforceable due to the failure of the
arbitrator to specify the amounts to be deducted from back pay. Id. at 596. In
addition, the Fourth Circuit held that because the CBA subsequently expired,
neither back pay nor reinstatement could be enforced after its termination. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award is not a sufficient reason for refusing to enforce the award. Id. at
598. Further, the Court noted that the Fourth Circuit's opinion pertaining to reinstatement and partial back pay was not based on any finding that the arbitrator did
not premise his award on the construction of the contract. Id. Rather, the Fourth
Circuit merely disagreed with the arbitrator's construction. Id. That reasoning
amounted to an impermissible review of the merits of the arbitrator's decision,
thus, rendering meaningless the provisions in the contract making the arbitrator's
decision final. Id. at 599.
In Warrior & Gulf, the Court reiterated the principle that the arbitrator's decision is not to be reviewed on the merits. 363 U.S. at 585. In doing so, it provided
even more deference to the arbitrator, indicating that the arbitrator performs
functions not normal to courts; that his source of law is not confined to the express
provisions of the contract, but also includes the practices of the industry and the
shop; that the arbitrator is chosen because the parties have confidence in his
knowledge and personal judgment; and that the ablest of judges cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance. Id. at 581-82. The arbitrator's award is to be upheld unless an
express provision excludes a particular grievance from arbitration, or the "most
forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration" is introduced. Id. at 585.
More recently, the Supreme Court applied this deferential standard toward
arbitrators' awards in United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., 484
U.S. 29 (1987). In this case, the Court again reiterated that the proper approach
to arbitration is to refuse to review the award on the merits. Id. at 37-38. A court
may not reject an arbitrator's fact-finding or contract interpretation simply because they disagree with it. Id. at 38. Provided that the arbitrator even arguably
acts within the scope of his or her authority, even the court's conviction that he or
she has committed serious error is insufficient to overturn the decision. Id.
For a discussion of the underlying reasons for the Court's extreme deference
to arbitrator's awards, see supra note 24 and accompanying text. For an historical
analysis and critique of the Supreme Court's extreme deference toward arbitrators
awards in the context of CBAs, see Summers, supra note 9, at 1021.
28. American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568. The Court found that even the processing
of frivolous claims may have therapeutic value. Id.
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arbitration clauses should be construed in favor of arbitration. 29 Arbitration is a peaceful mechanism to resolve disputes; therefore, the Court's
policy in favor of arbitration furthers the national policy of promoting in30
dustrial peace.
Problems arise under the Steelworkers Trilogy formulation when the
terms of the CBA are ambiguous. 3 1 Where such ambiguity exists, the
court may be forced to consider whether the disputed issue is one the
parties intended to be arbitrable.3 2 For example, in United Steelworkers of
29. Warrior& Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578. The inclusion of arbitration provisions in
CBAs is a major factor in achieving industrial peace. Id. Apart from matters the
parties specifically excluded, all questions on which they disagree must come
within the scope of the grievance and arbitration provisions of the CBA. Id. at 581.
An order to arbitrate should be granted unless it can be positively stated that the
arbitration clause excludes any interpretation that it covers the dispute. Id. at 58283. Finally, in Warrior & Gulf, the Court stated that "[d] oubts should be resolved
in favor of coverage." Id. at 583; see also Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S.
190, 209 (1991) (acknowledging presumption in favor of arbitrability where effective bargaining agreement exists); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S.
65, 78 (1991) (finding court of appeals approach flawed because it failed to consider strong policy favoring peaceful settlement of labor disputes); Nolde Bros.,
Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 430 U.S. 243, 255 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating
that where dispute is over provision in expired agreement "presumptions favoring
arbitrability must be negated expressly or by clear implication"); Boys Mkts., Inc. v.
Retail Clerks' Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970) (noting that congressional policy promotes peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration).
A comprehensive list of circuit court decisions enforcing the Supreme Court's determination of a presumption of arbitrability can be found in HARDIN, supra note
21, at 965-66 nn.67-68.
30. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's application of the national policy
furthering industrial peace in relation to arbitration, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am.,
475 U.S. 643, 653 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the issue of arbitrability and the merits
were the same. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Because of this finding, the appellate court reasoned that determining the arbitrability would involve an improper
decision on the merits, and concluded that the arbitrability issue should be submitted to the arbitrator. Id. Justice Brennan compared the AT&T Technologies case to
Warrior & Gulf, where the dispute also revolved around the meaning of the Management Functions clause. Id. at 653-54 (Brennan,J., concurring). He concluded
that the court of appeals erred in reading the Management Functions clause so as
to make arbitrability depend on the merits of the parties' dispute. Id. at 654 (Bren-

nan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan reasoned that the real question for the court
to decide was whether the parties agreed to submit disputes over the meaning of
the contract clauses to arbitration. Id. (Brennan,J., concurring). Because the collective bargaining agreement between AT&T and the union contained a standard,
broadly-worded arbitration clause, the Court found that the issue was arbitrable
unless expressly excluded elsewhere in the contract, or unless the party opposing
arbitration adduced "the most forceful evidence" to that effect. Id. at 655 (Bren-

nan, J., concurring).
32. See id. at 651. The Court held that in these situations it is for the court to
determine the question of arbitrability. Id.; see also Litton, 501 U.S. at 208. In Litton, the Court noted that although "doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage," the court must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute
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America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,3 3 the Supreme Court held that
under the generic terms of the broadly-worded arbitratior clause, claims
arising under the contract were arbitrable unless they were either specifically excluded within the contract, or excluded by the most forceful extrinsic evidence.3 4 Consequently, a court must delve into the merits of the
underlying claim to the extent that the parties may have agreed to exclude
that claim from arbitration. 3 5 To determine this question, courts admit
evidence concerning past practice and bargaining history.3 6 However,
such evidence is often the same evidence that would be offered to prove
the merits of the case.3 7 Thus, courts experience the most difficulty in
applying the law when the question on arbitrability and the question on
38
the merits of the claim are the same.
B.

The Duty to Bargain Until Impasse Imposed by the Unilateral
Change Doctrine

Once a CBA expires and negotiations over a new CBA commence, an
employer cannot unilaterally alter the previously established terms and
conditions of employment that are the subjects of mandatory bargaining
under section 8(d) of the NLRA. 3 9 The underlying rationale supporting
in question, and that duty cannot be avoided because it requires interpretation of
a provision of the bargaining agreement. Id. at 209 (citing AT&T Technologies, 475
U.S. at 650).
33. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
34. Id. at 584-85.
35. Id.; see also Summers, supra note 9, at 1028. Professor Summers points out
that when a court finds a dispute is not arbitrable, it is tantamount to deciding for
the employer on the merits. Id. He also suggests that courts look to the entire
agreement as well as to the parties intent and understanding in entering into the
agreement. Id. He points out, for example, that broadly-worded arbitration
clauses gives rise to a presumption that the parties prefer arbitration to litigation.
Id. at 1029-30.
36. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 572 (1960) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Under some circumstances a court may be required to examine the
substantive provisions of the contract to determine the parties meaning. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
37. See, e.g., Independent Lift Truck Builders Union v. Hyster Co., 2 F.3d 233,
235 (7th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that inquiries concerning whether grievance is arbitrable and whether grievance has merit both collapse into same inquiry).
38. See id. The Seventh Circuit pointed out that where the two issues collapse
into one, the inquiry creates tension between the two doctrines that apply to arbitrability of labor disputes - that on one hand the question of arbitrability is to be
decided by the court, and on the other hand, in deciding whether the parties have
agreed to submit a grievance to arbitration, a court cannot rule on the merits. Id.
at 235-36. In reviewing Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190
(1991), the Seventh Circuit determined that it stood for the proposition that when
"the court must, to decide the arbitrability issue, rule on the merits, so be it." Id. at
236.
39. § 8, 49 Stat. at 452 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994)).
This section provides:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
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the unilateral change doctrine is that if an employer could change the
terms and conditions of employment during negotiations, the union
would be unfairly disadvantaged. 40 In addition, the NLRA imposes a statuthe employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
...or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either
party ....
Id.
In NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), the Supreme Court held that the duty
to bargain collectively imposed by § 8(a)(5) could be violated without a general
failure of subjective good faith, if the party refused to bargain at all about the
mandatory subjects provided by § 8(d). Id. at 742-43. Thus, an employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotiation is a violation of
§ 8(a) (5), because it circumvents the duty to negotiate, frustrating the objectives
of the statute as much as a flat refusal. Id. at 743; see also Laborer's Health &
Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 544 n.6
(1988) ("'Freezing the status quo ante after a collective agreement has expired
promotes industrial peace by fostering a non-coercive atmosphere that is conducive to serious negotiations on a new contract.'" (quoting Katz, 369 U.S. at 743)).
The Supreme Court provided some enlightenment concerning what constitutes a subject of mandatory bargaining under the NLRA in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). The Court construed the words
of § 8(d), concerning the duty to bargain relating to "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment" as words of limitation. Id. at 348-49. Thus,
the duty to bargain is limited to those subjects contained in § 8(d), that the Court
further defines as areas relating to the employment relationship. Id. at 349-50.
A good example of a non-mandatory subject of bargaining can be found in
Borg-Warner,where the Court considered whether or not a "ballot" clause proposed
by the company was a mandatory subject of employment. Id. at 350. The clause
provided that for nonarbitrable grievances there had to be a secret ballot on the
company's last offer taken among all employees before the union could call a
strike. Id. at 346. If a majority of the employees rejected the company's last offer,
the company had the opportunity to make a new proposal and have a vote on it
prior to any strike. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that because the clause
actually sought to regulate relations between employees and the union, it was not a
subject of mandatory bargaining as defined by § 8(d). Id. at 350.
For a general discussion of the dichotomy between mandatory and permissive
bargaining, see HARDIN, supra note 21, at 594-96. There are actually three categories of bargaining subjects: mandatory, permissive and illegal. Id. at 594.
Mandatory subjects of bargaining are created by § 8(a) (5) and 8(d) and are limited to subjects enumerated in those sections, such as the duty to meet at reasonable times, and to conduct good faith discussion concerning wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment. Id. at 595. Permissive subjects include
"collective bargaining provisions covering supervisors or agricultural labor, performance bonds, legal-liability clauses, and internal union affairs." Id. Illegal subjects are those subjects that are forbidden from the bargaining table. Id. at 596.
Examples of illegal subjects include "closed-shop provisions, hiring-hall provisions
that give preference to union members, 'hot cargo' clauses that violate section
8(e), contract provisions inconsistent with a union's duty to fair representation,
and contract clauses that discriminate among employees on invidious bases, such
as race, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
40. Katz, 369 U.S. at 747. In Katz, the Court reviewed the three unilateral
actions the employer took and found each illustrated the policy and practical considerations behind the rule announced. Id. at 744. First, the company instituted
unilateral changes in the sick-leave plan by reducing the number of paid sick-leave
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tory obligation on both the union and the employer to bargain in good
faith. 4 1 In sum, the employer has a duty to bargain with the union both in
good faith and to impasse. 42 Once those two obligations are satisfied, an
employer may only impose unilateral changes after an impasse in negotia43
tions is reached.
days per year, but increasing the accumulation of unused days that could be carried over. Id. The difficulty resulting from this sort of change is that potentially it
divides employees, pleasing some but not others. Id. Thus, it creates warring factions among employees, making consistent bargaining difficult for the union negotiator. Id.
Second, the company unilaterally instituted an across-the-board wage increase
greater than that previously negotiated by the union. Id. at 745. The Court found
that the automatic wage increase conclusively demonstrated the company's bad
faith in negotiations, because such action was inconsistent with a sincere desire to
conclude an agreement with the union. Id.
Finally, the employer unilaterally granted merit increases to 20 out of the 50
employees in the unit. Id. at 746. The Court viewed this as tantamount to a refusal
to bargain as well. Id. Unlike a simple continuation of the status quo, the merit
increases were a drastic change in policy because there was no long-standing practice of granting merit increases. Id. Thus, there was substantial room for negotiation on this topic, which unilateral action by the company foreclosed. Id. at 747.
Despite the concern for the union's position evidenced by the Court's earlier
decisions, subsequent decisions under the "unilateral change doctrine" have been
criticized as unfairly disadvantageous to unions. SeeJames B. Zimarowski, Interpreting Collective BargainingAgreements: Silence, Ambiguity, and NLRA Section 8(d), 10 INDUs. REL. LJ. 465 (1988). Zimarowski contends that while the classification of
mandatory-permissive items is ostensibly neutral, in application, the dichotomy disadvantages labor's bargaining power. Id. at 468. This disadvantage results because
bargaining items classified as permissive are excluded structurally from the
mandatory reach of the collective bargaining process. Id.
41. § 8, 49 Stat. at 452 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994)).
For the text of § 8(d), see supra note 39.
Archibald Cox describes the reasons for the good faith requirement. Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith,71 HARv. L. Rv. 1401, 1412-13 (1958).
If the law merely compelled the parties to meet without considering the quality of
the negotiations, then an employer could simply go through the motions without
ever really bargaining at all. Id. at 1413. Such action by the employer is as destructive as refusing to recognize the union at all. Id. The concept of "good faith"
prevents the problem of bargaining without substance. Id.
The Supreme Court and lower courts have consistently held that good faith is
required under § 8(d). See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477,
484-85 (1960) (holding that duty to bargain in good faith is corollary of duty to
recognize union); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956) (holding that
duty to bargain in good faith requires that claims made by either side be honest);
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952) (stating that duty to
bargain "requires more than a willingness to enter upon a sterile discussion");
NLRB v. A-i King Size Sandwiches, Inc., 732 F.2d 872, 877 (11th Cir.) (noting duty
to bargain in good faith), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984).
42. See HARDIN, supra note 21, at 634. Where there are irreconcilable differences in the parties position, the law recognizes the existence of an impasse. Id. at
634-35.
43. Id. at 640. Once impasse occurs, the employer is free to make unilateral
changes in working conditions provided that such changes are consistent with offers previously rejected by the Union. Id.
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The unilateral change doctrine has both a procedural and a substantive impact.44 As a procedural matter, cases brought under the unilateral
change doctrine revolve around unfair labor practices where primaryjurisdiction vests in the NLRB. 4 5 Thus, if a dispute involves a subject of
mandatory bargaining under section 8(d) of the NLRA, it most likely will
be an unfair labor practice case as well and cannot be heard in federal
district court. 46 In contrast, actions under section 301 of the LMRA,

which include47actions to compel arbitration, may be brought in federal
district court.

Further, as a substantive matter, the NLRB has long recognized that
the unilateral change doctrine also extends to the contractual grievance
procedure. 4 8 It is the unresolved grievance that ultimately leads to arbitration, but surprisingly, the NLRB exempts the arbitration clause from the
prohibition on unilateral changes. 4 9 The NLRB reasoned that arbitration
44. For an excellent discussion of the unilateral change doctrine, see Corcoran, supra note 3, at 1077-82.
45. See HARDIN, supra note 21, at 28-29. To enforce the substantive provisions
of the NLRA, the Wagner Act established the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) in §§ 3-6 of the NLRA. Id. at 28. Section 10 of the Wagner Act gave the
NLRB exclusive jurisdiction over the unfair labor practices defined in § 8 and included provisions forjudicial review and court enforcement of NLRB orders. Id. at
28-29. Sections 10(e) and 10(f) vest the authority to review NLRB decisions in the
United States Courts of Appeals. § 10, 49 Stat. at 453 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 160(e),(f) (1994)).
46. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Stanbury
Uniforms, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 464, 467 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (stating unfair labor practice claims subject to exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB). For the exact sections of
the NLRA vesting such jurisdiction, see supra note 45.
47. See GOULD, supranote 18, at 140. Section 301 was intended to make CBAs
enforceable in federal courts. Id. Ironically, § 301 of the LMRA was passed out of
concern that unruly trade unions were unfaithful to the no-strike provisions negotiated for in CBAs. Id. For a full history and analysis of the impact of § 301, see
HARDIN,

supra note 21, at 957-79.

Because § 301 provides courts with the jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements, some overlap will occur between the courts and the NLRB in
those cases which also involve § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA. Id. at 968-69. The Supreme
Court has previously held that "[t]he authority of the Board to deal with an unfair
labor practice which also violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced
by § 301, but it is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts
under § 301." Id. at 969 (citation omitted).
48. See Bethlehem Steel Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1500, 1503 (1962). The NLRB
found that the grievance machinery is "[a ] method for presenting and adjusting

grievances which deal with 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-

ployment' [so] manifestly related to those matters." Id. at 1502. This determination was subsequently upheld in Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 284 N.L.R.B. 53
(1987). For a discussion of the Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. holding, see infra
notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
49. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 241, 242-43 (1970). The NLRB

found that the national policy favoring arbitration was not a sufficient inducement
to overlook the fact that arbitration is a matter of contract. Id. at 242. Thus, after
expiration of a CBA, the parties must continue to seek agreement over terms and
conditions of employment, as well as utilize the employee grievance procedure
established, but are not required to submit any grievances they are unable to re-
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is a consensual surrender of the economic power that the parties are
otherwise free to utilize. 50 Thus, if the union is free to strike after the
expiration of the CBA, the employer should not be bound to the arbitration provision. 51 The Supreme Court upheld .the NLRB's determination
that arbitration is properly excluded from the unilateral change doctrine
in Litton.52 Therefore, if the dispute is over the duty to arbitrate, even if
the underlying issue involves a subject of mandatory bargaining, the case
5
can be heard in federal district court pursuant to section 301. 3
C.

The Role Policy Plays in EstablishingRights and Duties Under
Expired CBAs

The issue of arbitrability after a CBA expires reflects a further refinement in decisional labor law.5 4 Courts have uniformly held that it would
be manifestly unjust to allow employers to escape arbitration for alleged
violations occurring while the CBA was in force merely because the grievance process was protracted until after the contract expired.5 5 The diffisolve to arbitration. Id. The NLRB seems to draw a distinction between the grievance process, which it refers to as a channel for grievance resolution, and
arbitration, which, as the final step in that channel, provides a binding resolution.
See id. at 242-43 (noting grievance procedure "channels for resolution of disputes"
is followed by binding arbitration if agreement has failed). For a criticism of the
distinction drawn between the grievance process and arbitration, see Corcoran,
supra note 3, at 1079.
50. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 284 N.L.R.B. 53, (1987). After reviewing
legislative history and previous court decisions, the NLRB held:
[w] e do not believe that the Court's general formulation in Katz of the
requirements imposed by Section 8(a) (5) is applicable to the postexpiration withdrawal from arbitration. To conclude otherwise flies in the face
of the specific admonition of the Court and the clear intent of Congress
that submission to arbitration is purely a matter of consent and cannot be
mandated by operation of the Act. Rather, we find because an agreement to arbitrate is a product of the parties' mutual consent to relinquish
economic weapons, such as strikes or lockouts, otherwise available under
the Act to resolve disputes, that the duty to arbitrate is sui generis. It cannot be compared to the terms and conditions of employment routinely
perpetuated by the constraints of Katz.
Id. at 58.
51. Id.
52. See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 200 (1991). The majority found the NLRB's position rational and consistent with the NLRA, and thus,
entitled to deference. Id. (citing Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482
U.S. 27, 42 (1987)). Further, the rule conforms with the Court's previous holdings
that the obligation to arbitrate a labor dispute arises solely under the contract. Id.
53. For a discussion ofjurisdiction under § 301, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
54. For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions in the area of post-expiration
arbitrability, see infra notes 58-78 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). In Wiley,
the Court held that a dispute over employees' rights to severance pay under an
expired collective bargaining agreement was arbitrable even though there was no
longer any contract between the parties. Id. at 547. Likewise, in Nolde Bros., Inc.
v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243 (1977), the
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cult cases arise when the parties are in dispute over when the rights and
obligations provided under the contract arose. 56 Typically in this situation, the union will argue that the rights either arose or vested during the
contract's terms and the employer will argue that they arose after its
57
expiration.
Court held that the termination of a collective bargaining agreement does not
automatically extinguish a party's duty to arbitrate grievances arising under the
contract. Id. at 251. In Nolde, the Court noted that, carried to its logical conclusion, such a holding would preclude arbitration of a dispute arising during the life
of the contract when arbitration proceedings had not begun before termination of
the contract. Id.
The CBA in Nolde contained provisions agreeing "to resolve all disputes by
resort to the mandatory grievance-arbitration machinery." Id. at 252. The dispute
"would have been subject to resolution under those procedures had it arisen during the contract's term." Id. Thus, the Court reasoned, because nothing in the
arbitration clause expressly excluded a dispute arising under the contract, but
based on events occurring after its termination, there were strong reasons to conclude that the parties did not intend their arbitration duties to terminate automatically with the contract. Id. at 253.
Following the principles established by the Supreme Court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in General Drivers v. Malone & Hyde, Inc.,
23 F.3d 1039 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 665 (1994), held that given the
national policy favoring arbitration, it would be inconsistent to relieve a party of
the duty to arbitrate when the dispute arose while the CBA was in effect, but had
not been resolved by the time the CBA expired. Id. at 1045-46.
56. See Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 284 N.L.R.B. 53, 54 (1987) (describing
employer's argument that grievances in question did not concern rights that
vested while contract was in effect and union's opposing argument). Troubled by
the concept that an employer may be perpetually bound to arbitrate terms under
an expired CBA, the NLRB sought to limit the duty to arbitrate to grievances arising under the expired agreement. Id. at 58. In its conclusion in Litton, the Court
provided a comprehensive overview of the inconsistent attempts by lower courts to
limit the post-expiration duty to arbitrate:
The conflict between the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas Culinary Workers Union, Local 226 v. Royal Center,
Inc., 796 F.2d 1159 (1986), and the Board's approach in Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 284 N.L.R.B. 53 (1987), reflects a wider split of authority. The Third and Fifth Circuits follow an approach similar to that of the
Ninth Circuit The Eight Circuit, Tenth Circuit, and the Michigan
Supreme Court follow the Board's approach and limit the presumption
of postexpiration arbitrability to rights that accrued or vested under the
agreement, or events that took place prior to expiration of the agreement. The Seventh Circuit, finally, restricts application of Nolde Brothers
to a limited period following expiration of a bargaining agreement.
Litton, 501 U.S. at 197-98 n.1 (citations omitted).
57. See International Bros. of Teamsters v. Pepsi-Cola, 958 F.2d 1331, 1332-33
(6th Cir. 1992) (examining union contention that grievance arose under terms of
expired CBA); Cumberland Typographical Union 244 v. Times, 943 F.2d 401, 405
(4th Cir. 1991) (noting company claims that dispute in question did not arise
under expired CBA); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Stanbury
Uniforms Inc., 811 F. Supp. 464, 466-67 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (presenting employer's
argument that agreement terminated onJanuary 1, 1992, and events giving rise to
complaint occurred after that date; union argued that even if agreement was not
in effect, disputed rights vested or accrued before termination).
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In the landmark case of Nolde Bros. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union,58 the Supreme Court held that severance pay was a
right that vested under the contract, and thus, the obligation to arbitrate
59
over when severance pay was due survived the contract's expiration.
Thus, disputes arising under the terms of an expired CBA can remain subject to arbitration. 60 In addition, when the parties do not expressly exclude post-termination arbitration, the Court found that the federal policy
61
of favoring dispute resolution by arbitration mandated its continuation.
Therefore, the Nolde Court established the broad proposition that a grievance hinging on the interpretation of rights arising under an expired contract could be arbitrable notwithstanding the fact that the events giving
62
rise to the grievance occurred after the contract's expiration.
The Court revisited this question in Litton FinancialPrintingDivision v.
NLRB. 63 In Litton, the Court held that because the disputed claim did not
"vest" under the contract, like the severance pay had in Nolde, the claim
58. 430 U.S. 243 (1977). For a discussion of the facts in Nolde, see infra note
59.
59. Id. at 252-53. The original CBA providing for the severance pay was terminated on August 27, 1973. Id. at 247. Negotiations continued until August 31,
when in response to a threatened strike, the employer informed the union that it
was closing the plant effective that day. Id. The employer paid accrued wages, but
refused either to pay severance pay under the expired CBA, or to submit to arbitration concerning its obligations under the expired CBA. Id.
60. Id. at 252-53.
61. Id. at 254-55. The Nolde Court noted that the "parties drafted their broad
arbitration clause against a backdrop of well-established federal labor policy favoring arbitration as the means of resolving disputes" arising under CBAs. Id. at 254.
The Nolde Court voiced an additional, practical concern that to allow an employer
to conclude presumptively that parties did not intend their arbitration duties to
terminate automatically with the contract "would permit the employer to cut off all
arbitration of severance-pay claims by terminating an existing contract simultaneously with closing business operations." Id. at 253.
62. Id. at 252-53. Justice Marshall subsequently restated the Nolde test as
"whether (1) the dispute is 'based on ... differing perceptions of a provision of the
expired collective-bargaining agreement' or otherwise 'arises under the contract,'
and, if so, (2) whether the 'presumptions favoring' arbitrability have been 'negated expressly or by clear implication.' " Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501
U.S. 190, 212 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Nolde, 430 U.S. at 249-55).
63. 501 U.S. 190 (1991). The dispute in Litton concerned whether seniority
was a right which could vest under an expired CBA. Id. at 209. The employer and
the union entered into a CBA that remained in effect until October 3, 1979. Id. at
193. The CBA contained a broadly-worded arbitration provision providing for a
two-step grievance process before submitting the matter to arbitration. Id. at 194.
An employee sought decertification of the union shortly before the CBA's expiration. Id. The NLRB conducted an election on August 17, 1979, where the Union
prevailed by only one vote. Id. Testing the NLRB's position, Litton refused to
bargain with the union. Id. The Board rejected Litton's position, declaring its
refusal to bargain an unfair labor practice. Id. In the meantime, Litton decided to
eliminate its coldtype operation at the plant, and laid off 10 of the 42 employees in
the operation in late August and early September of 1980. Id. "The layoffs occurred without any notice to the Union and included 6 of the 11 most senior
employees in the plant." Id.
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was not arbitrable after the expiration of the CBA. 6 4 Furthermore, the
Court suggested that, under the facts in Litton, the question of arbitrability
and the question of the underlying merits of the claim were the same.65
This holding caused a conflict between two of the four defining principles
laid down under the Steelworkers Trilogy (1) that arbitrability is a question
for the court to decide, and (2) that the court should not review the merits
of the underlying dispute. 6 6 The Litton Court decided that the former
principle should take precedence over the latter principle. 6 7 The Court's
primary rationale for this decision apparently rested on a concern that
otherwise frivolous suits might ensue. 68 Thus in Litton, the Court reviewed
the merits of the claim first and found that the underlying dispute was not
69
arbitrable under the terms of the expired contract.
Contrary to the Litton Court's claim that it merely interpreted NoIde,
the Litton Court narrowed the parameters for when a grievance is arbitrable under an expired CBA. 70 Specifically, the Court found that a postexpiration grievance could only "arise under" the contract in three ways:
(1) where the facts and circumstances arose before expiration, (2) where
the right vested or accrued under the contract, or (3) where the right
would survive the expired agreement under general contract interpretation principles. 71 In contrast, the Nolde Court's holding could be read far
64. Id. at 210.
65. Id. at 209. "[We must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
this dispute, and we cannot avoid that duty because it requires us to interpret a
provision of a bargaining agreement." Id.
66. Id. at 209-10. For a discussion of the four principles laid out in the Steelworkers Trilogy, see supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
67. See id. (stating that court must determine arbitrability even if it requires
interpretation of bargaining agreement).
68. Id. While acknowledging the presumption in favor of arbitrability when
an effective CBA exists and the agreement contains a broad arbitration clause, the
Litton Court "refused to apply that presumption wholesale" out of concern that "to
do so would make limitless the contractual obligation to arbitrate." Id. at 209.
Professor Summers notes that the Court apparently feared that applying the
presumption in favor of arbitration in the context of an expired CBA would give
rise to unlimited frivolous claims. Summers, supra note 9, at 1032. But, as he
points out, frivolous claims may be raised without limit while the CBA is in force.
Id. In fact, the Supreme Court has found that resolving such apparently frivolous
claims through arbitration may have some therapeutic value. Id. Summers argues
that because the obligation to arbitrate is controlled by the parties, they should
dictate whether courts or arbitrators should decide the merit of post-agreement
claims. Id.
69. Litton, 501 U.S. at 210. The Court noted that the order of layoffs under
the agreement looked first to aptitude and ability. Id. Only when those factors
were equal was the employer obliged to consider seniority. Id. The Court reasoned that because such factors as aptitude and ability do not remain constant, but
change over time, they cannot be considered to vest or to accrue as a form of
deferred compensation. Id.
70. Id. at 205-06.
71. Id. at 206.
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more broadly to incorporate any grievance where resolution of the claim
72
depended on the interpretation given the expired contract.
The Supreme Court's holding in Litton has generated confusion
among the circuit courts concerning when a court should consider the
underlying merits of a dispute. 73 Courts confronted with similar issues in
74
cases decided after Litton have interpreted the decision in three ways.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, as
well as the federal district courts that have considered the question, interpreted Litton as requiring courts to look to the merits in every situation in
order to determine arbitrability under expired CBAs. 75 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, interpreted Litton to
hold that a court should look to the merits of the underlying dispute only
when the question of arbitrability and the question on the merits collapse. 76 Finally, the Third Circuit, in an entirely unique approach, held
72. Id. at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that the majority grossly distorted the Nolde test for arbitrability when it held that the first
requirement was that post-termination disputes arise under the expired contract.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Under Nolde, a dispute arises under the agreement
when the resolution of the claim "hinges on the interpretation ultimately given the
contract." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). By specifically identifying that a postexpiration grievance can only be said to arise under the agreement where the
challenged action infringes a right accrued or vested under the agreement, or
under normal principles of contract interpretation, Justice Marshall argued that
the majority forces courts to review these substantive questions by passing on the
merits. Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting).
.73. For a discussion of the cases decided after Litton and their differing interpretations of the Litton decision, see infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
These differences arise due to the lack of clarity many courts find in the Litton
decision. See Luden's Inc. v. Local Union No. 6, 28 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 1994)
(noting that tension between Nolde and Litton breeds uncertainty in labor law);
Independent Lift Truck Builders Union v. Hyster Co., 2 F.3d 233, 236 (7th Cir.
1993) (noting that reasoning in Litton is less than clear before concluding that
court may decide merits of underlying dispute when that issue collapses with inquiry into arbitrability); Winery, Distillery & Allied Workers Local 186 v. Guild
Wineries & Distilleries, 812 F. Supp. 1035, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (asserting that
Litton Court came close to overruling Nolde and seriously weakened presumption
in favor of arbitrability).
74. For a discussion of the cases decided after Litton, see infra notes 75-78 and
accompanying text.
75. See International Bros. of Teamsters v. Pepsi-Cola, 958 F.2d 1331, 1333
(6th Cir. 1992) (citing Litton for proposition that in context of expired CBA, court
must determine whether parties intended to arbitrate dispute even if doing so requires court to interpret provision of expired agreement); Cumberland Typographical Union 244 v. Times, 943 F.2d 40fl 406 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding dispute
arbitrable after examining contract provisions because wages vested under expired
agreement); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Stanbury
Uniforms, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 464, 467-68 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (finding claim not arbitrable after looking to merits and citing Litton).
76. Hyster, 2 F.3d at 236. The court cited Litton for the proposition that the
policy of courts determining arbitrability takes precedence over the policy that
courts must not rule on the underlying merits of the dispute. Id. (citing Litton, 501
U.S. at 209). Therefore, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that if the issue of arbi-
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that after a CBA expires, an implied-in-fact contract can arise. 77 This approach enabled the Third Circuit to narrow the issue to whether the arbitration clause survived the implied contract and, thus, avoid reviewing the
78
merits of the dispute.
III.
A.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S LuDEN'S RESOLUTION

The Rule Announced in Luden's Conforms with Supreme Court Precedent
and Compares Favorably with the Procedure Used in Other
Circuit Courts

In Luden's Inc.. v. Local Union No. 6, the Third Circuit confronted the
typical case concerning whether an arbitration clause survived the expiration of the CBA. 79 At trial, the district court, interpreting the Supreme
Court's Litton decision as instructing courts to construe the contractual
terms of the CBA in question, held that Luden's did not have to arbitrate
the dispute.8 0 The Third Circuit, by adopting the implied-in-fact contract
theory, avoided that result. 8 '
trability cannot be determined without also ruling on the merits, then the court
must do so. Id.
77. Luden's, 28 F.3d at 349. For a discussion of Luden's implied-in-fact contract theory, see infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
78. Id. at 354. The implied-in-fact contract theory allows the court to avoid
the tension between Nolde and Litton. Id. Using this theory courts need only look
to whether the arbitration clause was encompassed in the implied-in-fact CBA. Id.
at 361.
79. 28 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. 1994). The dispute arose over the retroactivity of
wages under the terms of an expired CBA. Id. at 349. On May 1, 1988, Luden's
and-the union executed a CBA (1988 CBA). Id. The 1988 CBA contained a clause
entitled "Duration of Agreement" which provided:
This Agreement shall be and remain in full force and effect for a period
of three (3) years until and including April 29, 1991, and thereafter, until
a new agreement, the wage clause of which shall be retroactive to the
above given date, has been consummated and signed, or until this Agreement, upon sixty (60) days notice in writing, has been terminated by the
Union with the sanction of the Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers' International Union of America or has been terminated by the
Company.
Id. at 349-50. In addition, the 1988 CBA incorporated a tiered grievance procedure culminating in final and binding arbitration. Id. at 350. Prior to the expiration of the 1988 CBA, the parties began negotiations on a new CBA. Id. The
parties agreed on substantially all terms for the new CBA with the exception of the
retroactivity of the wage scale. Id. at 351. The union invoked the grievance and
arbitration procedure provided by the 1988 CBA. Id. Luden's then brought an
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
seeking a declaratory judgment that the retroactivity of wages under the expired
1988 CBA was not arbitrable. Id.
80. Id. at 352-53.
81. Id. at 354. The Third Circuit ruled that it did not have to consider the
conflicting rules in Litton and Nolde because Luden's contractual duty to arbitrate
grievances never completely lapsed. Id.
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The general theory relied on by the Third Circuit was that implied-infact CBAs have sure footing both in contract law and federal labor policy.8 2 The court noted that general contract law both recognizes and enforces implied-in-fact contracts. 8 - Moreover, it found that an implied-infact CBA is compatible with the goals of federal labor policy.8 4 Finally, the
Third Circuit noted that the implied-in-fact contract theory is consistent
with the Supreme Court's holding in Litton, because both parties are free
to modify the arbitration clause unilaterally after the lapse of the CBA. 85
The Luden's decision purports to resolve the tension between the two
main precedential cases, Nolde and Litton, by providing a reasonable alter82. Id. at 354-55; see also Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 202
(1991) (stating that § 301 of LMRA "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of
federal law for the enforcement of [CBAs]") (citation omitted); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) (stating that "[a] promise may be stated in
words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct").
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's application of contract theory in resolving
disputes arising under CBAs, see supra note 12.
83. Luden's, 28 F.3d at 355. The court grounded its premise in established
contract law, quoting from the Restatement:
Contracts are often spoken of as express or implied. The distinction involves, however, no difference in legal effect, but lies merely in the mode
of manifesting assent. Just as assent may be manifested by words or other
conduct, sometimes including silence, so intention to make a promise
may be manifested in language or by implication from other circumstances, including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance.
Id. at 355 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. a (1981)).
Thus, the Luden's court held that, under general contract principles, when a contract lapses but the parties continue to act as if they are performing under that
contract, the material terms of the prior contract survive unless one of the parties
"clearly and manifestly indicates" that it no longer intends to be bound. Id. at 35556.
Several other courts of appeals have decided cases similar to Luden's based on
like reasoning. For example, in Cumberland Typographical Union 244 v. Times &
Alleganian Co., 943 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit found that the
parties, by their conduct, manifested an intention to accept arbitration. Id. at 405.
In that case, the parties continued to behave as though the agreement was still in
effect after it had expired. Id. Likewise, in International Board of Boilermakers
Local 1603 v. Transue & Williams Corp., 879 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1989), the company continued to accept and process grievances in accordance with the expired
CBA. Id. at 1393. During this time, the union did not strike, picket or resort to the
use of any economic weapons, but continued to work for the pay rates negotiated
in the previous contract. Id. Thus, the Sixth Circuit found that both parties' conduct showed an intent to remain bound to the grievance and arbitration provisions
in the previous contract. Id. Finally, in United Paperworkers International Union
v. Wells Badger Industries, 835 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit held
that the company's conduct manifested an intent to be bound to the terms of the
expired agreement. Id. at 703.
84. Luden's, 28 F.3d at 358; see also Mack Trucks Inc. v. International Union,
UAW, 856 F.2d 579, 592 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that employer and union can create enforceable labor contract without putting it in writing, as long as there is
conduct indicating parties' intent to be bound by contract's terms).
85. See Luden's, 28 F.3d at 362 (stating that such recognition of implied-in-fact
CBA does not defeat NLRB's primary jurisdiction over unfair labor practices).
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native.8 6 The Third Circuit read Nolde to hold that courts should order
arbitration under expired CBAs if the CBA potentially affected the issue in
dispute.8 7 Thus, the Third Circuit found Litton at odds with Nolde because
under the Litton decision, courts must decide if the expired CBA actually
creates the obligation in dispute in order to determine arbitrability.8 8
The majority of courts confronted with the question of arbitrability
under an expired CBA have construed Litton in the same manner as the
Third Circuit.8 9 The exception is the Seventh Circuit.90 Specifically, in
Independent Lift Truck Builders Union v. Hyster Co.,91 the Seventh Circuit
held that Litton applies only where the question of arbitrability and the
question of the merits of the underlying issue collapse into one. 9 2 The
Hyster court's interpretation of Litton is perhaps the most logical. Under
its interpretation, the dual doctrines that govern the question of arbitrability but not the merits survive intact in all but a few, limited
93
situations.
The problem is that courts may experience difficulty in applying the
Hyster interpretation because under it, arguably, the Litton Court immediately misapplied its own test. 94 A review of a few of the leading cases illus86. See id. at 354 (stating that Litton holding is in contradistinction to Nolde).
87. Id. at 353. The Third Circuit interpreted the Nolde holding to mean "that
courts are not to reach the merits of the dispute, but instead are to order arbitration if the lapsed CBA arguably creates the obligation at the center of the grievance." Id.
88. Id. at 354. The Third Circuit construed Litton to hold that "a court has
the duty to reach the merits of the claim, and can order arbitration only if it concludes that the lapsed CBA in fact creates the right or obligation at issue." Id.
(citation omitted).
89. For a discussion of the post-Litton decisions, see supra notes 55-57 and
accompanying text.
90. Independent Lift Truck Builders Union v. Hyster Co., 2 F.3d 233 (7th Cir.
1993). For a discussion of the Hyster decision, see infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
91. 2 F.3d 233 (7th Cir. 1993).
92. Id. Although the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the reasoning in Litton is "less than clear," it found that Litton stands for the rule that where the questions of arbitrability and the merits are one, the court must determine both. Id. at
236. For a further discussion of Hyster, see supra note 38.
93. Id. The Litton Court pointed to AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643 (1986), a case where the lower courts initially found the issues as to arbitrability and the merits the same, as authority for
the proposition that the court must determine the issue of arbitrability. Litton Fin.
Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 208-09 (1991). The Supreme Court noted
that "[w]hether or not a company is bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it
must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the court, and a party cannot be
forced to 'arbitrate the arbitrability question.' " Id. (quoting AT&T Technologies,
475 U.S. at 651). Therefore, the majority reasoned, courts could not avoid that
duty because it required interpretation of a provision of a CBA. Id. at 209.
94. See Litton, 501 U.S. at 216 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "the right
to have layoffs made according to the standard of qualified seniority could vest
under the contract"); see also Corcoran, supra note 3, at 1086 (agreeing with Litton
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trates how easily this mistake is made. 95 For example, in Nolde the issue in
dispute was whether severance pay was a right vested under the expired
CBA, and thus, subject to arbitration. 96 The Supreme Court noted that
while the dispute arose after the CBA expired, it clearly arose under the
contract which contained a clause providing for severance pay.9 7 In Nolde,
the merits of the dispute involved a separate inquiry from arbitrability, yet
the lower court held that the issue was not arbitrable because the employees' right to severance pay expired with the termination of the agreement-a ruling based on the merits of the claim.9 8
In AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America,99 the
dispute concerned the interpretation given to the contract clause govdissent that rights at issue-seniority, ability and aptitude, were vested rights under
the contract).
Corcoran notes that seniority is given sacrosanct treatment in many shops. Id.
It may be a determining factor when deciding layoffs, transfers, promotions, vacation scheduling and other employment decisions. Id. Thus, seniority is a right
capable of vesting in the contract. Id.
Professor Summers commented that under either settled contract principles,
or the principles announced in the Steelworkers Tilogy, the result in Litton should
have been determined by the arbitrator. Summers, supra note 9, at 1031. Instead,
Summers noted that Justice Kennedy "brazenly" decided the case on the merits.
Id. Litton, in fact, typifies the case where a court mistakenly decides arbitration is
precluded because the underlying claim is moot, rather than looking to see
whether the contract required arbitration. For a discussion of cases decided like
Litton, see infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
95. For a discussion of the specific cases, see infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
96. Nolde Bros. Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers
Union, 430 U.S. 243, 244 (1977). The union argued that the severance wages

provided for were comparable to "accrued" or "vested" rights, earned by employ-

ees during the term of the contract, and thus were analogous to vacation pay, but
payable only on termination of employment. Id. at 248. In addition, the severance-pay clause did not explicitly state that the employees' right to severance-pay
expired if the events triggering payment did not occur during the life of the contract. Id. at 249. Nolde Brothers contended that because severance-pay was a creation of the CBA, its substantive obligation to provide such benefits ended with the
contract. Id. The CBA in dispute expired on July 21, 1973. Id. at 246. The parties
engaged in negotiations for a new CBA until August 31, when Nolde Brothers,
faced with a threatened strike after the union's rejection of its latest proposal,
informed the union that it intended to close the bakery permanently. Id. at 247.
The union then instituted a § 301 action seeking to compel Nolde Brothers to
arbitrate the severance-pay issue. Id.
97. Id. at 249.
98. Id. at 247. The district court held that the employees' right to severance
pay expired with the CBA, and that as a result, there was no longer a severance-pay
issue to arbitrate. Id. The court noted that the duty to arbitrate was created by the
contract, and so terminated with the contract. Id. at 248. The Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the district court approached the case from the wrong direction. Id. The Fourth Circuit pointed out that the first question here is whether the
duty to arbitrate survived the contract. Id. If so, then the dispute is arbitrable and
the arbitrator should determine whether the severance-pay obligation survived the
contract. Id.

99. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
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erning a lay-off procedure.10 0 The employer argued that the terms of that
clause, read in conjunction with the Management Prerogatives clause in
the CBA, precluded the issue from arbitration.' 0 The Seventh Circuit
held that in order to decide the question of arbitrability, the court would
have to construe the clauses at issue and decide on the merits.' 0 2 Because
there were "colorable arguments" on both sides, the Seventh Circuit
agreed with the lower court that under these limited circumstances, the
issue of arbitrability must also be decided by the arbitrator.' 0 3 On review,
the Supreme Court remanded, holding that because the CBA contained a
broadly-worded arbitration clause and did not specifically exclude disputes
with respect to the clauses in question, a court could conclude that the
parties intended disputes over the meaning of those clauses to be
04
arbitrable.,
The Litton Court struggled with the issue of whether qualified seniority rights, including a consideration of aptitude and ability, could vest
under the contract.' 0 5 As the dissenters in that case pointed out, because
100. Id. at 645. Article 20 from the CBA provided that: "[w] hen lack of work
necessitates Layoff, Employees shall be Laid-Off in accordance with Terms of Employment and by Layoff groups as set forth in the following [subparagraphs stating
the order of layoff]." Id. n.3.

101. Id. at 646. Article 9 of the Management Prerogatives Clause stated:
The Union recognizes the right of the Company (subject to the limitations contained in the provisions of this contract, but otherwise not subject to the provisions of the arbitration clause) to exercise the functions
of managing the business which involve, among other things, the hiring
and placement of Employees, the termination of employment, the assignment of work, the determination of methods and equipment to be used,
and the control of the conduct of work.
Id. at 645 n.2.
102. Communications Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 751 F.2d 203, 204 (7th
Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 814 (1985), and vacated sub nom. AT&T Technolo-

gies, 475 U.S. at 643.
103. Id. at 207. The Seventh Circuit reviewed Supreme Court precedent and
noted that previously decided cases cautioned courts to avoid becoming enmeshed
in the merits of a labor dispute under the guise of determining arbitrability. Id. at
205-06 (reviewing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960) and Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)). Therefore,
while acknowledging that the question of arbitrability is for the courts to decide,
the Seventh Circuit announced a narrow exception to that general rule where determining the arbitrability issue would entangle the court in interpretation of substantive provisions of the CBA and involve determination of the merits of the
dispute. Id. at 206-07.
104. AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 654-55 (Brennan, J., concurring). The
question for the court was confined to the issue of whether the parties agreed to
submit disputes over the interpretation of Article 20 of the CBA to arbitration. Id.
at 654 (Brennan,J., concurring). Thus, AT&T Technologies,like Nolde, instructs the
court to look to see if the issue in dispute is one controlled by the CBA. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). If so, the court should find the dispute arbitrable under the
contract provided that the CBA contained a broadly-worded arbitration clause and
did not specifically exclude the disputed issue from arbitration. Id. at 654-55
(Brennan, J., concurring).
105. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 209 (1991).
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there was a strong argument that such rights vested under the contract,
that question should have been left to the arbitrator to decide. 10 6 In each
of the preceding three cases, courts and individual justices disagreed over
whether it was necessary to decide the underlying merits in order to determine arbitrability. 10 7 Moreover, the cases themselves provide no doctrinal
guidelines to assist future courts in making such determinations.10 8 As a
general rule, the cases illustrate that courts arrive at the wrong conclusions
when they look to mootness of the underlying claim as a guide for determining arbitrability. The better approach is to ignore the issue of whether
or not the underlying claim survived termination of the CBA and look
only to whether the duty to arbitrate survived it. 10 9
In contrast to the preceding three cases discussed, in Independent Lift
Trucks Builder Union v. Hyster Co.,110 the issues of the merits and arbitrability truly collapsed."' There, the dispute revolved around whether
retired employees were covered under the terms of the CBA. 112 The Seventh Circuit noted that because regular employees were unquestionably
covered under the agreement, if the term "employee" included retirees,
then the grievance was both arbitrable and meritorious.' 13 Thus, while
106. Id. at 216 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Among other arguments, Justice
Marshall noted that the CBA in question listed six specific ways an employee could
lose seniority, none of which included termination of the agreement. Id. at 216-17
(Marshall, J., dissenting). In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens noted
that determining whether seniority is a vested right should be a separate issue. See
id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. For a discussion of the facts of each case, see supra notes 96-104 and
accompanying text.
108. See Hartley, supra note 9, at 357 (commenting that after Litton, decisions
must be on case-by-case basis because no clear standard emerges to guide courts).
109. See Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 430 U.S. 243 (1977). Rather
than looking to whether or not the underlying claim survived the termination of a
CBA, the court must first determine if the duty to arbitrate survived. Id. at 248. If
so, then the dispute is arbitrable. Id.
110. 2 F.3d 233 (7th Cir. 1993).
111. Id. at 235. Of course, where the merits and the question of arbitrability
are not the same, under established labor law principles, the court simply looks to
the issue of arbitrability first and can ignore the merits. See a/soJohn Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964) (stating that because duty to arbitrate is

contractual, before arbitration can occur, there must first be judicial determination that CBA creates that duty); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238,
241.(1962) ("Under our decisions, whether or not the company was bound to
arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by
the Court on the basis of this contract entered into by the parties.").
112. Hyster, 2 F.3d at 235. This general inquiry satisfied the three basic inquiries of the parties-whether the union had standing to file a grievance on behalf of

the retired employees, whether this grievance was arbitrable and whether there
was any merit in the union's grievance. Id.
113. Id. at 235-36. In 1968, the employer established a medical plan to cover
retired employees. Id. at 234. Later, the company entered into a series of CBAs
with the union. Id. In March and May of 1992, the company implemented

changes reducing coverage of certain medical benefits for retired employees. Id.
The union filed a grievance on behalf of the retired employees and one current
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the Hyster opinion may be the most logical reading of Litton, because it
preserves the doctrines established in previous decisions, courts find the
4
concept difficult to apply."
By contrast, the solution offered by the Third Circuit in Luden's requires no such judicial gymnastics. The rule is relatively clear and straightforward in its application. 115 Where the expired contract contains an
arbitration clause, and the parties continue to behave as if they are performing under that contract, the material terms of the contract, including
the arbitration clause, remain intact unless clearly repudiated." 6
B.

The Luden's Approach Under Unilateral Change Doctrine

A potential problem arising under Luden's implied-in-fact contract
theory, however, is that, if it applies to mandatory subjects of bargaining,
the jurisdictional and substantive issues raised under the unilateral change
doctrine are implicated."17 The Third Circuit noted that the unilateral
change doctrine prohibits the employer from changing existing terms and
conditions of employment that are considered subjects of mandatory bargaining during negotiations unless the parties have bargained to impasse." 8 If the implied-in-fact contract incorporates these subjects of
mandatory bargaining, the employer is forever bound to those terms because they cannot later be repudiated as can non-mandatory subjects of
bargaining, like the arbitration provision." 9 The Third Circuit neatly
sidestepped this problem by holding that the implied-in-fact CBA could
not incorporate subjects of mandatory bargaining.' 2 0 In fact, the Luden's
court's modification of the implied-in-fact contract theory with respect to
employee who was considering retirement. Id. The company denied the grievance and refused to submit to arbitration. Id. The district court found that the
dispute over arbitrability could be reduced to a single question over the interpretation of the term "employee" in the CBA. Id. at 235. If that term included retired
employees, then under the terms of the current CBA the union's grievance would
clearly have merit. Id.
114. For a discussion of cases where lower courts have erroneously found the
issue of the merits and arbitrability the same, see supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
115. Luden's Inc. v. Local Union No. 6, 28 F.3d 347, 355-56 (3d Cir. 1994).
The reasoning behind this rule is that by continuing through words or conduct to
behave in a way that suggests that a voluntary, contractual relationship has not
changed, although its period has lapsed, the parties to the contract are justified in
reasonably expecting that each will continue to abide by the expired agreement's
terms. Id. at 356.
116. Id. at 355-56.
117. For a discussion of the jurisdictional issue, see supra notes 45-47 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the "unilateral change doctrine," see supra
notes 39-43 and accompany text.
118. Luden's, 28 F.3d at 361. For a discussion of the duty to bargain to impasse, see supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
119. For a discussion of the dichotomy between permissive and mandatory
bargaining, see supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
120. Luden's, 28 F.3d at 362.
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the unilateral change doctrine was entirely consistent with past precedent
1 21
in the labor law context.
C.. Luden's Application of Contract Theory to Find an Implied-in-Fact CBA
The Luden's decision is most vulnerable to attack when the court attempts to fit the facts of the case to its implied-in-fact contract theory. As
the dissent in Luden's states, the majority's implied-in-fact contract theory
actually results in the creation of a quasi-contract because there was no
"meeting of the minds" between the two parties. 12 2 A meeting of the
minds is a well-established element of an implied-in-fact contract. 123 In
Luden's, the employer had clearly repudiated the expired CBA in writing
to the union. 124 Thus, the employer did not consider any of the terms of
125
the expired CBA to remain in effect.
In fairness to the employer, the doctrine espoused in Luden's could
only be applied prospectively. After Luden's, employers in the Third Circuit will realize that a general repudiation of the expired contract does not
release them from an implied continuation of some of its terms. 126 The
employer in Luden's, however, could not have known that to repudiate the
arbitration clause effectively, it was necessary to do so twice, because not
only is the implied-in-fact contract theory in this context unique to the
Third Circuit, but neither side briefed or argued the issue until requested
12 7
to do so by the Third Circuit.
121. See, e.g., Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 470 (1960) (holding
that national labor policy is 'important consideration in determining whether same
inferences which would usually be drawn respecting third-party agreements should
be drawn in this context).
122. Luden's, 28 F.3d at 365 (Alito, J., dissenting). Judge Alito noted that
"[b]ecause the court does not seem to be concerned about the meaning that the
parties attached to their putative agreement, the court's decision does not appear
to be based on a contract that is implied in fact .... Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
123. See Baltimore & O.R.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923)
(holding that implied-in-fact contract is "founded on a meeting of the minds,
which ... is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing in the light of
the surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding"); Hickman v. United
States, 135 F. Supp. 919, 922 (W.D. La. 1955) (stating that criteria for whether
there is implied-in-fact contract rests on consent inferred from circumstances
showing mutual intention to contract).
124. Luden's, 28 F.3d at 350.
125. Id. The employer's letter informed the union that Luden's wished to
terminate the 1988 CBA "effective 10:01 a.m. Monday, May 13, 1991." Id.
126. For a discussion of precisely how an employer must repudiate the implied continuation of some of the expired CBA's terms, see infra notes 128-31 and
accompanying text.
127. Luden's, 28 F.3d at 354. The Third Circuit declined to follow other
courts' lead in finding that Litton impliedly overruled Nolde. Id. Instead, it requested that the parties file supplemental memoranda concerning whether, under
federal common law of CBAs, the Third Circuit should recognize an implied-infact CBA arising from the parties' conduct after the expiration of the 1988 CBA.
Id. At that point, Luden's argued vigorously that their letter terminating the expired CBA amounted to a repudiation of an implied-in-fact CBA. Id. at 360.
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PRACTIcAL APPLICATION

In the aftermath of the Luden's decision, it is crucial that both employers and unions understand and follow the steps provided by the court after
the expiration of the CBA. First, the termination of a CBA alone does not
manifest the "clear, particularized intent" necessary to disavow its terms
and prevent some of the expired CBA's provisions from being immediately revived as part of an implied-in-fact CBA. 12 8 A generalized repudiation of the expired CBA affects only future disputes arising after such
notice, and will not affect disputes involving pre-expiration facts or accrued rights under either the original or implied-in-fact CBA. 129 Second,
the implied-in-fact CBA may be expressly repudiated, or repudiated by
conduct.1 30 Thus, based on the facts of Luden's, the party who wishes to
repudiate the CBA must expressly or by unmistakable conduct repudiate
3
both the expired CBA as well as the implied-in-fact CBA.1 1
In its application, the approach the Third Circuit outlined in Luden's
offers many advantages. First, the rule allows courts to avoid deciding
cases involving post-expiration arbitrability on the merits.13 2 Second, the
rule furthers well-established labor law principles including the presumption in favor of arbitrability and CBAs in general to lessen industrial
strife.' 33 Finally, the rule is simpler to understand and apply than the rule
announced in Litton, and so would tend to reduce arbitrary decisions
among the courts.13 4 In an era where labor relations have become increasingly strained, it is imperative that courts continue to favor arbitration as the best means of peacefully resolving labor disputes. Those courts
which have not yet considered the issue are urged to adopt the Luden's
128. Id. at 360. Termination of a CBA only serves to end the terms that both
parties intended to terminate. Id. When termination occurs, either party may still
"repudiate the implied-in-fact terms unilaterally at any time [after termination]
without providing the notice required were the CBA still in effect." Id.
129. Id. at 361 n.24 (citing litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190,
205 (1991) (listing three types of disputes that could arise after expiration of
CBA)).
130. Id. at 357 n.16. While noting the impossibility of providing a recipe for
future conduct in order to preclude the formation or terminate the existence of
an implied-in-fact arbitration provision, the court noted that either a lockout or
strike would sufficiently evince a party's desire not to be bound. Id.
131. Id. at 360-61.
132. For a discussion of the benefits of a rule enabling courts to avoid deciding cases involving arbitration on their merits, see supra notes 115-16, and accompanying text. The Luden's court's approach avoids the criticism raised by Justice
Marshall's dissent in Litton, and by numerous commentators, that decisions after
Litton will involve courts in a case-by-case review of the merits, thus, potentially
leading to more litigation. For a discussion of Justice Marshall's dissent in Litton,
see supra note 106 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of the national policy underlying the NLRA, see supra
notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion of the differing interpretations of the Litton decision,
see supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
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solution, as it offers the fairest treatment to both parties in a difficult situation.
Ramona Mariani
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